

SECRET

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

I. Gloomy late word from Paris indicates Faure abandoning intention to press for immediate solution to Moroccan impasse. Backdown, when it becomes known, will increase danger of further eruptions Moroccan violence. At the same time, political tensions generating in metropolitan France threaten disintegration of Faure's coalition and fall of govt.

A. Steps in Faure's original Morocco program (Aix agreement with Nationalists) had included:

1. "Withdrawal" of ben Arafa;
2. Simultaneous establishment "Council of the Throne;"
3. Formation of all-Moroccan government, which would negotiate reorganization of Moroccan administration.

DOCUMENT NO. 3216  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 25X1  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 17 Jan 81 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

B. However, program has been stymied for weeks at "first step," since Arafa has refused quit Throne.

C. Now US embassy reports Faure will not press for Arafa ouster, in order to avoid rift with rightist elements in his coalition.

*Arafa*

II. Sultan's most significant support is coming from these French rightists--Juin-Koenig-LeComte-Montel group.

A. Also supported by reactionary settler's organization--"Presence Francaise"--claiming to represent majority of 400,000 French in Morocco, and now reported openly arming selves for attacks on natives.

III. Both the Moroccan Nationalists (at Aix conference) and ex-sultan ben Youssef (from exile in Madagascar) have shown remarkably conciliatory attitude toward French.

**SECRET**

SECRET

- A. However, French abandonment Arafa ouster will badly weaken position of moderates.
- B. Nationalist leaders know their supporters in Morocco already fretting under moderate policies.
- C. They fear that extremists may capture nationalist organization.
  - 1. Extremist-called strikes already beginning in major Moroccan cities.
- D. Meanwhile, French in Morocco attempting to discredit principal nationalist party, Istiqlal:
  - 1. Residency official has blamed party's "insincerity, inconsistency" for present impasse.
- E. Another Residency official (26 Sep) said French now ready for "showdown" with nationalists; continued that France does not mind stripping European defenses, since danger of war with USSR not negligible.

SECRET

SECRET

1. Official affirmed that French reprisals for 20 Aug Oued-Zem massacre totalled 5,000 members of guilty Berber tribes, (hoped this would serve as warning to other tribes).

- IV. In all North Africa, now, French Army forces total some 220,000--up 50% from a year ago. More than half are Metropolitan forces, 5% are black Africans: 34% are North African.
  - A. Force includes 4 NATO-committed Divisions plus battalions from such divisions to a total of 50% of France's NATO-committed Army personnel:
  - B. Addition of police, gendarmerie and quasi-military brings total to over 300,000.

4  
SECRET

C. Much of the French Army's equipment is US-supplied. Although heavy equipment remains in France, lighter materiel has accompanied North African reinforcements and in one "accidental" case, trucks have arrived in Morocco still bearing US markings.

V. In Algeria, meanwhile, reinforced French formations are busy mopping up the rebels' "Army of God" and the state of emergency, previously confined to the Department of Constantine and to western Oran, has been extended to the entire area.

A. The latest political crisis in Algeria arose Monday, the day before an extraordinary session of the Algerian Assembly was to meet, when 42 (out of 60) Moslem members threatened to boycott the session.

SECRET

B. The Moslem delegates rejected French reform proposals as "too little too late," demanded an end to the repression program and endorsed the concept of an autonomous Algeria, "federated" with France.

VI. Meanwhile, in Paris, Faure's position is considerably more precarious than was case in July, in light convening National Assembly 4 Oct.

A. North Africa trouble, together with domestic French labor unrest, may counterbalance general Assembly reluctance to overthrow him before national elections (spring 1956).

B. However, no Assembly discussion of govt policy likely before mid-October (reorganization of Assembly's administration is first order of business).

SECRET

C. Faure and Pinay visit to Moscow  
(scheduled 14 October), plus Geneva talks  
(starting 24 October), will also be  
strong deterrents to attempt to unseat  
Faure during initial weeks of Assembly  
session.